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Introduction
According to the governmental opinion polls held in November 2020, 80.8 per-
cent of the public support the death penalty (80.3 per cent in 2014 and 85.6 per cent 
in 2009).1)  One of the largest victim lobbies, Zenkoku Hanzai Higaisha no Kai (Nation-
al Association of Crime Victims and Surviving Families, or NAVS), also shares the 
same sentiment and members view the death penalty as an ultimate punishment to 
bring justice to victims and their bereaved families.  Despite the consistently high 
public support on the death penalty as observed in opinion polls, it is worth explor-
ing the voices of the general public and minority victim lobbies.  The first part of 
this article will look at how the NAVS was founded and how members perceive the 
purpose of punishment.  The second part will then investigate the divergent public 
view on the death penalty.  Recent murder incidents and executions have exposed 
mixed opinions amongst the public regarding whether or not executions can help 
heal the wounds of the victims’ bereaved families and bring closure to the unprece-
dented incidents.  Notable examples include: 1) Sagamihara Stabbings in 2016; 2) 
executions of those responsible for the Aum Sarin Nerve Gas Attack on the Tokyo 
Subway in 2018; and 3) Kyoto Animation Arson Attack in 2019.  –This article will 
shed light on the applicability of the apparent mainstream support for ‘punitive pop-
ulism’ observed in the opinion polls, specifically considering the voices of some of 
the victim lobbies, community groups and the general public.
1.1.  Mainstream Victim Lobby’s View on the Death Penalty
The NAVS was founded in 2000 by an attorney, Okamura Isao.  He is a former 
Vice Chairman of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations and was an active anti-
death-penalty advocate for the Federation.  An incident occurred when Okamura 
was working as a legal advisor of Yamaichi Securities Co.  An unemployed male, 
Nishida Hisashi, ‘had demanded that the failed Yamaichi Securities make up for his 
stock trading losses through the brokerage since May 1991 […but this] was rejected 
by the company through Okamura’s office’.2)  After serving a prison term till 1996 
being convicted of attempting to extort money from Yamaichi in a separate case,3) 
Nishida (67 at the time) went to Okamura’s house on 10 October 1997 intending to 
murder him.  As Okamura (72 at the time) was out on that day Nishida stabbed his 
wife Manae (63 at the time) to death instead for resentment.
Nishida was sentenced to life imprisonment with a parole by the Tokyo District 
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Court in September 1999.  However, Okamura called this decision unjust and 
sought capital punishment: ‘It is possible that the defendant will be released on pa-
role after 10 years.  My wife, who was killed, will never come back”.4)  In January 
2000, Okamura set up the NAVS ‘to better protect crime victims’ rights, which he 
believes are less protected than those of offenders’.5)  Nishida’s life sentence with a 
parole was however confirmed on 29 May 2001 considering that there was only a 
single victim in this case and Nishida had been showing remorse.  With his strong 
belief that it is only the death penalty that could bring justice to the victims and their 
bereaved families, Okamura has been a vocal pro-death-penalty advocate in the 
NAVS.
1.2.  Divergent Views on the Death Penalty in Japan
The NAVS thus demonstrates a strong pro-death-penalty sentiment and the gen-
eral public is often portrayed as sympathetic to the victim lobby’s claim as shown in 
the governmental opinion poll results.  However, it has been pointed out by academ-
ics that survey questions have been strategically phrased in order to draw conclu-
sions in favour of the governmental retention of the death penalty.6)  In seeking pub-
lic opinion, the poll required participants to choose between three choices: 1) ‘it is 
unavoidable in certain circumstances’, 2) ‘it should be abolished in all circumstances’, 
and 3) ‘I don’t know’.  Sato Mai analyses that the first two answers appear to have 
been framed strategically in order to produce results which would justify govern-
mental policy.7)  In contrast to the second answer, the first one leaves some room for 
discussion regarding the level of public support for the death penalty.  In other 
words, those who do not necessarily feel strong support for capital punishment may 
choose the first answer.  In addition, as David T. Johnson and Franklin E. Zimring 
point out the secrecy surrounding the death penalty and ‘censored democracy’.8)  In 
other words, binary choice obscures a broader spectrum of opinions.  In order to ex-
plore the extent to which pro-death-penalty opinion poll results mirror the public’s 
view on this system, the following section will explore divergent views by victims’ 
bereaved families, community groups and the general public through examining 
three high profile cases in contemporary Japan.
1.2.1.  Sagamihara Stabbings in 2016
The stabbings in the Tsukui Yamayuri En care home for people with disabilities 
occurred in the early hours of 26 July 2016 in Sagamihara, Kanagawa prefecture. 
Uematsu Satoshi, a 26-year-old former employee of the care home stabbed sleeping 
residents in the chest or slashed their throats,9) resulting in the death of 19 people 
aged between 19 and 70 and injuring 26 others.10)  Soon after the attack, Uematsu 
turned himself in to the police station.
Uematsu appears to have planned this crime for at least half a year in advance 
and on 14 February 2016 he had ‘tried to hand-deliver a three-page letter to Lower 
House Speaker Oshima Tadamori at his official residence in Tokyo’11) declaring that 
he was going to murder disabled people in the care home.  In the letter he expressed 
his discriminatory view on people with disability: ‘My goal is a world in which the 
severely disabled can be euthanised, with their guardians’ consent, if they are un-
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able to live at home and be active in society’.12)  The letter also covered full details of 
his plan of killing 470 disabled people: ‘[I] would attack at night when fewer workers 
were on duty, bind them with zip ties, slaughter residents and then turn […myself] 
in.’13)  Uematsu is also reported to have made similar remarks to his co-workers at 
the care home before quitting the following day.14)  The police had taken this matter 
seriously and:
reported the case to the Sagamihara Municipal Government, which decided to 
commit Uematsu to a psychiatric hospital out of concern he could harm others. 
[…Although he] was diagnosed with marijuana-induced psychosis and para-
noid disorder […] he was not diagnosed as an addict and was released on 
March 2.  […] The care facility, meanwhile, followed police advice and in-
stalled 16 security cameras.15)
After the arrest, Uematsu ‘apologised’ to staff members for injuring them and to vic-
tims and their bereaved families for taking the victims’ lives away.16)  However, he 
maintained that ‘severely disabled people create misery’ and described his experi-
ence as ‘worthwhile’ as in his opinion ‘his claims have reached people who will 
serve as lay judges in the trial through media and other channels [and] he does “not 
have anything in particular” that he wants to say in the trial’.17)  It goes without say-
ing that his mental competency became a major focus in the trial as he had previ-
ously tested positive for marijuana.  However, Uematsu insisted that ‘he will not 
claim that he is too mentally incompetent to take responsibility for the attack in his 
upcoming trial.’18)
The media featured this incident as the worst mass killing in decades at the time 
and the Prime Minister Abe Shinzo commented, “The lives of many innocent peo-
ple were taken away and I am greatly shocked.  We will make every effort to discov-
er the facts and prevent a reoccurrence.”19)  Kawana Katsuyoshi, a senior official in 
the Welfare Department at the Kanagawa Prefectural Government, also stated that 
‘discrimination, prejudice and intolerance for individuals who are deemed different 
from others still exist in society […but the Department will endeavour] to deliver 
messages in order to eradicate discriminatory ideologies’.20)  The death sentence for 
Uematsu was finalised on 31 March 2020 after he withdrew his appeal on the day 
before.
As previously discussed, the largest victim lobby in Japan claims that it is only the 
death penalty that could bring justice to the victims and their bereaved families. 
Given that Uematsu targeted socially vulnerable individuals and have made dis-
criminatory remarks against them, it would be easy to assume that victims’ be-
reaved families would share the same view.  However, it deserves a particular atten-
tion that a brother (61) of a female victim (60 at the time of the crime) is reported to 
have shown a mixed feeling towards the sentence.21)  He had previously visited Ue-
matsu at the detention centre and attended the trial.  However, he felt a great degree 
of disappointment as he could not see Uematsu show sincere remorse to victims and 
their bereaved families at any point.22)  It appears that what the victim’s brother 
wanted to see was not necessarily the heaviest punishment sentenced to Uematsu, 
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but a gradual change in Uematsu’s distorted view on people with disabilities.
Similarly, a community group called ‘Remember 7.26 Kobe Action’ had protested 
against the possible death sentence to Uematsu in March 2020.  The group is com-
posed of over 160 people with or without disability and had been campaigning on 
three grounds:
1) What they would like to see is the defendant showing sincere remorse and 
apologies to the victims and their bereaved families.  The death penalty, on 
the other hand, deprives him of time and opportunity to do so.
2) ‘Eliminating’ (mashō ) the defendant from the society through the death pen-
alty, labelling him as a malicious individual who upsets social order, resem-
bles the defendant’s motive to ‘eliminate’ those with disability labelling 
them as those who create nothing but misery to the society.  Telling the de-
fendant through the death sentence that he is not worth living can end up 
supporting his idea of eugenics–those with disability are not worth liv-
ing–and strengthen this concept which prevails in the society.
3) This incident posed a serious issue surrounding people with disability.  In 
order to prevent reoccurrence, we will need to work together to de-construct 
and re-build the society where discrimination, prejudice and intolerance for 
those with disability prevails.  The death sentence given to the defendant 
may be considered by the general public as a closure to the incident and the 
issue which was uncovered by this incident can be forgotten again.23)
Some victims’ bereaved families and community groups thus provide different views 
to the ‘mainstream’ support on the death penalty and this poses an important ques-
tion of: what justice is; for who justice exists; and whether or not justice can be only 
achieved through giving the ‘heaviest punishment’.  It may appear at first sight that 
‘eliminating’ Uematsu from the society through death can help bring justice to vic-
tims, heal the wounds of victims’ bereaved families and demonstrate to the wider so-
ciety that those who commit serious crimes get prosecuted and punished appropri-
ately.  However, it is questionable to what extent this can help deter similar crimes 
from reoccurring.  In fact, we cannot ignore the social factors surrounding Uematsu 
including his upbringing which may have potentially helped shape his distorted 
view on disabled people.  This may include certain perceptions on disabled people 
and their role in the society.  Some victims’ bereaved families and community 
groups do not want the issue surrounding disabled people to be forgotten behind the 
punishment Uematsu will face.  They may indeed appreciate it if Uematsu could live 
and receive an appropriate psychiatric treatment to help him atone for the crime he 
committed.
Relating to this, the recent executions of the Aum cult members revealed mixed 
opinions amongst the public regarding whether or not the sensational media cover-
age of executions was appropriate; and whether or not simultaneous executions of 
Aum members in two stages helped bring closure for the families of the victims of 
the largest terrorism event.
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1.2.2.  Executions of Aum Shinrikyo Cult Leader and Senior Members in 2018
Asahara Shoko, whose real name was Matsumoto Chizuo, was a leader of a 
doomsday cult group Aum Shinrikyo based in Kamikuishiki Village at the foot of 
Mount Fuji.  The cult successfully recruited young professionals including doctors 
and scientists and under the direction of Asahara the members ‘built and operated a 
chemical plant to mass-produce sarin and another to assemble automatic rifles’.24) 
Asahara was later found guilty for his involvement in crimes including the murder 
of the anti-cult lawyer Sakamoto Tsutsumi and his family in November 1989, and the 
sarin nerve gas attack in Matsumoto, Nagano in June 1994.25)  The most high-profile 
crime they committed was the sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway on 20 
March 1995 where 13 people were killed and more than 6,000 were injured.  Asaha-
ra was sentenced to death in 2004 and his sentence was finalised by the Supreme 
Court in 2006.  After more than a decade since the final death sentence, Asahara 
and six former senior members of the cult group was executed on 6 July 2018 with a 
further six senior members on 26 July 2018.
1.2.2.1.  Delays in Executions
As Japan Times reported in January 2018:
The Aum trials were unprecedented in Japan’s judicial history in terms of their 
sheer number and the length of the deliberations.  […] Due to the complexity of 
the background of the cases and the members’ relationships, the trials dragged 
on.  Asahara’s trial, in particular, took seven years and 10 months, with the 
courts convening 257 times in total.26)
Asahara developed a mental illness due to his long-term detention on death row.  He 
was no longer able to use the toilet by himself and started wearing baby nappies in 
2001; he often mumbled words and/or fell asleep during his trials and hearings for 
former Aum senior member; and communication with his family and lawyer which 
had started in 2004 stopped in 2008 as he was no longer able to have a conversation 
with others.27)  Six psychiatrists hired by the lawyers of Asahara therefore raised 
concerns about his mental and physical health and claimed that he was not fit to 
stand trial or face execution.28)  Asahara’s fourth daughter also filed a civil case with 
the Yokohama Family Court in May 2017, however, the Tokyo Detention Center 
maintained that ‘The inmate has not shown clear signs of mental disability.  If urged 
to leave his cell to do exercise or take a bath, he complies, but he has stubbornly 
refused to meet visitors’.29)  Despite Article 479 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
stipulating that executions of death row inmates with mental health must be put 
on hold as stipulated in, it is reported that a senior justice official had commented 
that ‘We cannot leave someone who committed such heinous crimes to die from 
disease’.30)
The reason that Asahara’s and his former senior members’ executions were de-
layed was not due to the Ministry’s consideration on Asahara’s mental health.  Arti-
cle 475 (2) stipulates that the Minister of Justice shall order the executions of the in-
mates within six months from the date when the court judgement becomes final and 
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binding.  However, it also specifies that the period before the proceedings of all co-
defendants are finalised are not included in this period.  When all defendants’ sen-
tences were confirmed in December 2011–apart from the three who had been on 
the run (Hirata Makoto, Kikuchi Naoko and Takahashi Katsuya)–the media specu-
lated that executions of Asahara and former Aum senior members may take place 
without waiting for the arrest of the remaining three.31)  Fearing this possibility, Hi-
rata Makoto turned himself in on the night of 31 December 2011 after 16 years since 
the incident; and Kikuchi was arrested on 3 June 2012 and Takahashi on 15 June 
2012.  Hirata later admitted during his trial that he turned himself in to have the ex-
ecutions of former senior members pushed back.32)
1.2.2.2.  Executions and Public Response
Approximately 23 years of the Aum trials came to close on 19 January 2018, six 
years after the arrest of the remaining three defendants, and the governmental focus 
and public attention soon shifted to when the 13 members would be executed.  It 
was speculated by various bodies that executions would take place prior to the abdi-
cation of Emperor Akihito on 30 April 2019 or the Tokyo Summer Olympics which 
was originally scheduled to start on 24 July 2020 at the latest:
In 2019, the country will have a new emperor for the first time in three de-
cades, while the following year’s Tokyo Olympics herald a return of the Sum-
mer Games to Japan after a gap of more than 50 years.  […] By getting these 
“negative stories” out of the way now, future celebrations need not be overshad-
owed–or so the thinking goes.33)
Whilst the Gregorian calendar is widely used in Japan, the name of the era, which is 
introduced each time a new emperor accedes to the throne, is primarily used in gov-
ernmental or other official documents in Japan.  It was therefore speculated that ex-
ecutions of the Aum members would take place by the end of the Heisei era in the 
reign of Emperor Akihito.
On 14 and 15 March 2018, the Ministry of Justice transferred seven out of the 13 
inmates to five detention centres with execution facilities across Japan, leaving Asa-
hara and five others at the Tokyo Detention Center.34)  On 6 July 2018 Asahara and 
six former Aum senior members were executed, with a further six former members 
on 26 July 2018.  Justice Minister Kamikawa Yoko did not disclose details about the 
executions regarding how the seven inmates were selected for the first executions 
and only commented at the following press conference that the Ministry of Justice 
gave a great deal of careful consideration on the executions.35)
Executions of all the 13 were finally carried out after more than two decades from 
the devastating incident and appeared to have finally brought ‘justice’ to the victims 
and their bereaved families.  However, sensational media coverage divided the opin-
ions of the general public including retentionists.  Fuji TV, one of the leading TV 
stations in Japan, showed a panel of the 13 death row inmates’ pictures and a TV an-
chor put a sticker which says ‘executed’ on each picture as each execution was con-
firmed.36)  This however reminded the viewers of the live media coverage of the 
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elections when the panel of candidates’ pictures is shown and a sticker with a red 
flower is put on each picture as they secure their seats.37)  The excessive media cov-
erage gave the general public an impression that the media agencies were broadcast-
ing this news as some kind of entertainment; and Nakajima Takeshi, a professor in 
the History of Thought in Japan, called it ‘public executions where only the actual 
scene of hanging was hidden’.38)
Nonetheless, what deserves attention is that whilst some thus showed skepticism 
towards the media coverage of executions of former Aum members, this did not ap-
pear to have created a momentum to join the initiative of putting the death penalty 
on hold or abolishing it.  They may not agree from moral perspectives with the way 
executions of former Aum members were featured by the media.  However, they 
may fundamentally support the view that the death penalty should be retained for 
serious crimes, which may be helping maintain the pro-death-penalty sentiment ob-
served in the governmental opinion polls.
Whilst the Japanese government  aimed toleave the negative legacy of the Aum 
incident behind by executing the members during Heisei era,:
Aum renamed itself Aleph in 2000 and two splinter groups have since been 
formed.  The followers of the three groups total about 1,650 in Japan and 460 
in Russia, according to the Public Security Intelligence Agency.39)
Japan has only eradicated the founder of the cult group and a very small portion of 
former members therefore there is no guarantee that remnants of the cult would not 
plan terrorism in a similar or larger scale in the future.  This closely relates to the fu-
ture execution of Uematsu who committed Sagamihara Stabbings in 2016.  ‘Elimi-
nation’ of convicts may appear to serve as justice to those affected by the crime and 
lawful citizens in the wider society; and a lesson to be learnt by those who are prone 
to smaller crimes.  However, it is fundamentally more crucial to investigate the root 
causes of the crimes and try to address underlying factors in the society such as so-
cial attitude towards people with disabilities and perceptions in the society.
Whilst the Aum case remains one of the largest terrorism incidents in Japan con-
sidering that 13 people were killed and more than 6,000 were injured, Japan has re-
cently experienced the worst mass casualty incident in its post-war history: Kyoto 
Animation arson attack.
1.2.3.  Kyoto Animation Arson Attack in 2019
In the morning of 18 July 2019, Aoba Shinji (41 at the time) walked into the 1st 
Studio building of Kyoto Animation–centre of the company’s anime production–
and poured petrol in multiple areas of the building before igniting it.40)  About 30 
fire engines and ambulances went to the three-storey building after an explosion but 
it took four hours for firefighters to bring the blaze under control as every storey had 
been damaged by the fire.41)  There were 74 employees in the building.  However, 
many did not have time to escape as the fire spread so rapidly.42)  As a result, 36 
were killed and 34 were heavily injured.  Founded in 1981, Kyoto Animation, often 
referred to as KyoAni by fans at home and abroad, was a major force in the industry 
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and had a reputation for putting its employees first:43)
KyoAni has produced popular anime TV series and feature films, as well as 
publishing illustrated novels and manga.  […] Many anime artists are paid on a 
per-frame basis and tight deadlines make the work gruelling and long hours in-
evitable.  Kyoto Animation bucks the trend by making its animators full-time 
employees.  This allows them to spend more time on each image and create 
high-quality anime.44)
When Aoba tried to run away from the crime scene after igniting the petrol, he did 
not get far as he was in critical condition himself with burns covering 90 percent of 
his body.45)  He was first taken to a hospital in Kyoto but was airlifted to the Osaka 
hospital two days later by request of the Kyoto police.46)  Whilst the Osaka hospital 
prioritised the use of donor skin for the victims, Aoba underwent ‘surgeries using 
prosthetic skin and his own skin only’.47)  According to the experts, ‘The survival 
rate drops dramatically when about 30 percent of the body has third-degree burns 
[and] The probability of dying rises to almost 99 percent when such burns cover 
around 90 percent of the body, making the treatment an unusual case’.48)  However, 
Aoba ‘became the first person with such extensive critical burns to undergo surgery 
without using donor skin’.49)  His condition was no longer life-threatening by early 
August and improved to the point where he could talk and eat.50)  He was therefore 
moved back to the hospital in Kyoto on 14 November 2019 and was arrested on 
murder and arson charges on 27 May 2020, approximately 10 months after the inci-
dent.
When the police first surrounded Aoba at the crime scene, he told the police that 
he did this because the company had plagiarised his work.51)  According to the com-
pany president, they had received a number of death threats through their webpage 
in the past two years but Aoba’s name did not appear in any of the threatening 
emails.52)  Aoba had in fact submitted manuscripts to the company for the Kyoto 
Animation Award.53)  However his applications had not been considered as it had 
not passed the first selection stage for failing to meet the submission criteria.  The 
company president therefore denied Aoba’s accusation of plagiarising his work.54)
It appears that Aoba had suffered from mental illness over decades which trig-
gered this crime.  Previously, Aoba had served more than three years for robbing a 
convenience store in Ibaraki prefecture in 2012 and was being treated for an unspec-
ified mental illness.55)  After the robbery, he turned himself in to the police claiming 
to be a member of the Aum cult and that he would not be able to evade law enforce-
ment.56)  After being released in 2016, he lived ‘in a subsidized dormitory for former 
prisoners, where he could live rent free and receive meals […and] eventually moved 
to his own apartment […] in Saitama’.57)  However Aoba soon developed a dispute 
with his neighbour for grabbing his chest and shouting “I will kill you.  I have noth-
ing to lose.”58)
The media featured this crime as Japan’s worst mass casualty incident in its post-
war history given that the death toll from this incident was greater than the Aum Sa-
rin Gas Attack in 1995, which killed 13.59)  As Colin P.A. Jones, a professor at Doshi-
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sha Law School in Kyoto, states, whilst Japan enjoys its very low crime rate, ‘there 
are periodic spasms of random and extreme violence […and] the general physical 
safety that is so noteworthy about Japan heightens the contrast when those things do 
occur.”’60)
Following Aoba’s arrest, KyoAni released a statement expecting Aoba to be pros-
ecuted ‘to the maximum extent’ under the law: “We have no further words for the 
suspect…  Our fallen colleagues will never return, and our wounds will never heal.”61) 
On 18 July 2020, marking the first anniversary of the incident, representatives of the 
victims’ bereaved families also released a statement via their attorneys.62)  The state-
ment included special thanks to all who got involved in trying to save lives of the 
victims–residents near the crime scene, fire fighters, police officers, doctors and 
nurses–and their thanks also extended to KyoAni fans at home and abroad for 
their emotional support.63)  The statement also showed that victims’ bereaved fami-
lies are still in deep sorrow for their loss and strongly wished that appropriate sen-
tence will be given to Aoba in the court.64)
KyoAni representatives’ wish for the death penalty to be imposed on Aoba and 
victim’s bereaved families’ wish for the ‘appropriate sentence’, which implies the 
death sentence, are not difficult to understand given the tremendous loss.  Having 
said that, the same questions still remain: whether or not punishing Aoba through 
the death penalty would help bring closure to the incident.  Aoba received world 
class skin surgery despite that there was almost a 99 percent chance of dying.  If sav-
ing Aoba’s life had been wished by the police and prosecutors only as a means to 
help him recover to the level he can stand trial, this appears to be the same logic as 
the one of the senior justice official regarding the execution of Aum cult leader: ‘We 
cannot leave someone who committed such heinous crimes to die from disease’.65) 
Eliminating’ Aoba from the society alone cannot help build a safer society and it is 
important to focus on examining the root causes of the crime.  Given that Aoba has 
suffered from unspecified mental illness for many years, provision of an appropriate 
psychiatric treatment may support prevention of similar cases in future and should 
be given as due prominence as ensuring the provision of victim support following 
incidents.
Conclusion
This article examined the divergent domestic debate on the death penalty in Ja-
pan through looking at high-profile murder cases.  Whilst governmental opinion 
polls demonstrate that a majority of the public appear to support the death penalty 
and the mainstream victim lobby also appears to share the same view, some victims’ 
bereaved families and community groups question the purpose of punishment. 
Some victim lobbies including disabled people, their families and care workers, and 
activists express concerns about the rights of disabled people not to be discriminat-
ed against.  Others also raise a question of whether or not executions of offenders 
can bring closure to the incident.  The death penalty is often seen as an ultimate 
punishment to bring justice to the victims and their bereaved families.  However, 
some victim lobby would like the convict to live and show remorse for the crimes 
committed, and the society to discover the root causes of the crime and to bring 
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about change to prevent similar crimes from reoccurring.
However, it also merits some attention that although the Aum case, for example, 
made the general public feel skeptical about the way executions were broadcasted, 
this did not appear to have led them to join the initiative to abolish the death penal-
ty or put executions on hold.  Whilst wide public support on the death penalty ap-
pears to be party due to the strategic phrases used in the opinion polls and the se-
crecy surrounding the policy, emerging discussions appear to be taking place with a 
presumption that the death penalty remains in place in Japan.  Unpacking the voices 
of vocal retentionists, anti-death-penalty victim lobbies and the general public, who 
are not necessarily against the retention of the death penalty but skeptical about the 
way executions are featured, could be a first step towards understanding the com-
plexity behind the vast majority support of the death penalty.
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 16) “Uematsu Shikeishū , Sagamihara Sashō Hanketsu Kakutei ni ‘Shakai no Yaku ni Tatta, Izoku ‘Munashii 
Saiban’ (Umematsu Recalls the Sagamihara Knife Rampage as Helpful for the Society after the 
Death Sentence is Finalised.  Victims’ Bereaved Families are Disappointed by the Trial),” Yomiuri, 
31 March 2020.  Available at: https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/20200331-OYT1T50229/ [Ac-
cessed 29 July 2020]
 17) “Alleged Sagamihara Killer Won’t Claim Lack of Criminal Responsibility in Forthcoming Trial,” 
Japan Times, 24 July 2019.  Available at: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/07/24/national/
crime-legal/alleged-sagamihara-killer-wont-claim-lack-criminal-responsibility-forthcoming-trial/ 
[Accessed 29 July 2020]
 18) Ibid.
 19) “Japan Knife Attack: 19 Killed at Care Centre in Sagamihara.”
 20) “Alleged Sagamihara Killer Won’t Claim Lack of Criminal Responsibility in Forthcoming Trial.”
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